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SPATIAL RESOURCE WARS: A TWO REGION EXAMPLE
GIORGIO FABBRI, SILVIA FAGGIAN, AND GIUSEPPE FRENI
Abstract. We develop a spatial resource model in continuous time in which two agents
strategically exploit a mobile resource in a two-locations setup.
In order to contrast the overexploitation of the resource (the tragedy of commons) that
occurs when the player are free to choose where to fish/hunt/extract/harvest, the regulator
can establish a series of spatially structured policies. We compare the three situations in
which the regulator: (a) leaves the player free to choose where to harvest; (b) establishes
a natural reserve where nobody is allowed to harvest; (c) assigns to each player a specific
exclusive location to hunt.
We show that when preference parameters dictate a low harvesting intensity, the poli-
cies cannot mitigate the overexploitation and in addition they worsen the utilities of the
players. Conversely, in a context of harsher harvesting intensity, the intervention can help
to safeguard the resource, preventing the extinction and also improving the welfare of both
players.
Keywords: Spatial harvesting problems, Markov perfect equilibrium, Environmental protec-
tion policies, Differential Games
JEL Classification: Q28, C72, Q23, C61, R12.
1. Introduction
Stationary Markov perfect Nash equilibria in models with a common property resource
stock have been studied under different hypotheses in the literature (see e.g., Levhari and
Mirman, 1980, Clemhout and Wan, 1985, Negri, 1989, Tornell and Velasco, 1992, Dockner
and Sorger, 1996, Sorger, 1998, Tornell and Lane, 1999, Rowat and Dutta, 2007, Strulik,
2012a, 2012b, Mitra and Sorger, 2014, 2015, Dasgupta, Mitra and Sorger, 2017. Long, 2011,
2016, survey the literature). The typical setting is the one in which a homogeneous stock,
whose growth function is known, is harvested by a finite number or a mass of identical agents
who reap utility from consuming the resource. Since the analysis of the Markov perfect
Nash equilibria has turned to be difficult, straightforward results have been obtained only
for special growth and utility functions (see e.g., Dockner, Jorgensen, Van Long and Sorger,
2000, section 12.1 for the case of an exhaustible resource with a CRRA instantaneous utility
function). Although there are a few exceptions, the usual conclusion in this literature is
that non-cooperation leads to overexploitation of the resource (the so called “tragedy of the
commons”).
In view of the above technical difficulties, it is not surprising that the literature that
considers strategic interaction when resources are heterogeneous is sparse. In recent years,
however, both in growth theory and in environmental and resource economics there has been a
growing interest in the economic effects that specifically arise when spatial distributed stocks
are subject to diffusion or dispersal processes (see e.g., Smith, Sanchirico and Wilen, 2009;
Xepapadeas, 2010; and Brock, Xepapadeas and Yannacopoulos, 2014, for surveys). Fish
stocks, to take an obvious example, are spatially distributed and in many cases they move
across different locations. Similarly, stocks of air or water pollutants are rarely stationary at
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the emission point, but diffuse in space. Even water reservoirs, and some exhaustible resources
as oil deposits, have a spatial dynamics. Since the economic effects of the mobility in space
of these stocks are sometimes relevant, the process of spatial diffusion they follow cannot
be always abstracted from in the study of their exploitation. For example, territorial use
rights fisheries (TURFs) can be more or less effective depending on the spatial externalities
associated with the movements of fish stocks. In these cases, the analysis faces the challenging
task of modeling the economic forces shaping the dynamics of extraction of moving spatially
distributed stocks.
Although the literature is rapidly growing (Costello, Querou and Tomini, 2015, Herrera,
Moeller and Neubert, 2016, Costello, Nkuiya and Querou, 2017, de Frutos and Martin Herran,
2018), dynamic strategic interaction is largely absent from the studies that have introduced
spatial-dynamic processes in growth or resource models. In these works, the analysis pro-
ceeds either on the assumption that rent dissipates instantaneously (e.g., Sanchirico and
Wilen, 1999), or on the assumption that the planner either controls the entire environment
(e.g, Boucekkine, Camacho and Fabbri, 2013), or takes the spatial distributed stock path as
given (e.g., Janmaat, 2005, Santanbrogio, Xepapedeas, Yannacoupolos, 2017). Clearly, these
assumptions are not well suited for the analysis of the spatial externalities that arise when
the resource is a moving spatial distributed stock, but access is restricted to a small number
of extractors.
We develop in this work a simplified framework to study spatial resource wars. Our aim is
to provide an analytically tractable model that highlights how difficult is to design an efficient
systems for the management of the resource based on spatial property rights, if the spatial
externalities stemming from the movements of the stocks are not completely internalized. We
compare the behaviors of the agents in a initial common property case, where they can decide
both where and how much to harvest, with their choices in policies-constrained cases, where
the regulator can establish a natural reserve or assign an harvesting location to each agent.
We show that implementing these policies can only be effective when the agents choose an
high harvesting intensity/effort.
To have an analytically solvable model, some simplifications are made. First, we chose
to study a two-regions, two-players case. Second, as is often assumed in the literature, we
suppose the stock diffuses from the higher density to the lower density location at a constant
rate. Third, as it can be expected, special growth and utility function are used, since, as it is
well known, not even a mere existence results for Nash equilibria can be obtained in a general
framework. Since we look for linear Markov equilibria, tight restrictions must be imposed
on the primitives of the model and we use throughout the paper the family of CRRA utility
functions and linear (re)production functions (see Gaudet and Lohoues, 2008, for similar
conditions for the scalar common pool case).
For the case in which the preferences of the agents dictate low harvesting intensity, the
existence of a symmetric local Markov perfect Nash equilibrium is proved and explicitly
characterized in the three scenarios we study: (a) the initial common property case, where
each agent can decide, at any times in which region(s) to harvest and how much; (b) the
reservoir case, where the regulator forbid the agents to harvest in one of the two regions;
(c) the TURF Case, where each player can only harvest in a specific (exclusive) region. For
each situation we characterize the optimal response function of the players, the resource stock
evolution (and in particular its (re)production rate at the equilibrium) and the utility of the
players.
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It turns out that, in case of low harvesting intensity, the mentioned spatial property rights
policies cannot improve the growth rate of the resource and in particular they cannot prevent
its depletion/extinction in case the implicit rate(s) of growth is positive, but very small.
Furthermore their effect on the utilities of the agents is never positive and, in almost all the
circumstances, they strictly worsen the utility of at least one of the players.
The analysis of the results allow us to show (see Subsection 3.4) that a voracity effect
similar to that described by Tornell and Lane (1999) can arise in the spatial context we have,
and to identify what kinds of “technological” shocks generate it. As expected, if voracity
prevails, then an increase in any of the local intrinsic growth rates of the resource reduces
growth. Notably, however, it turns out that also a reduction in the spatial mobility of the
resource has the same effect.
Things change sharply when a policy induces the agents to choose their maximal effort
(Section 4). In the high harvesting intensity case indeed the territorial policies we men-
tioned, and in particular the creation of a reservoir, can determine an effective reduction
of the overexploitation and have a consequent positive impact on the rate of (re)production
of the resource. The policies can, in suitable circumstances, prevent the (asymptotic) de-
pletion/extinction of the resource that would occur under a regime of common property.
Moreover, for suitable choices of the parameters they can also increase the utility of all the
agents.
In comparison with existing literature, the model here is a spatial generalization of the
classical Levhari and Mirman (1980) example of a “fish war”1 and is closest to the models
in Herrera, Moeller and Neubert (2016), De Frutos and Martin Herran (2017), and Costello,
Nkuiya and Querou (2017). All three study Markov perfect Nash equilibria in models with
a mobile spatially distributed stock. Differently from Herrera, Moeller and Neubert (2016),
that is essentially a numerical paper, we do not only focus on steady states but we charac-
terize equilibrium feedbacks, we describe the whole optimal trajectory and the corresponding
transition dynamics. In this way we can also analyze how the welfare changes in the various
specifications of the problem. Among these, we also include property rights on the various
parts of the sea. In this last sense, our specification is more similar to the one used by De
Frutos and Martin Herran (2017) which study a transboundary pollution linear-quadratic dif-
ferential game. The approach is a little different in the contribution by Costello, Nkuiya and
Querou (2017) where the authors use a two-patch discrete time model to study the strategic
effects induced by the threat of a regime shift affecting the movement of the resource. They
have asymmetric players and study a two-stage problem. However, their post-shift problem
is structurally similar to our problem, although they assume the agents do not consume the
harvest but sell it on local competitive markets. Their Markov perfect Nash equilibrium is
linear but, differently from the equilibrium we find in our model, there is an initial jump to
the stationary state and the extraction strategy of each agent is independent of the other
region’s stock.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we describe the two-players two-locations
model. In Section 3 we study it in the three mentioned specifications: the common property
case (Section 3.1), the reservoir case (Section 3.2), the TURF case (Section 3.3). In addition
to this we discuss the impact of policies comparing payoffs and evolution of stocks in these
various cases (Section 3.4). In Section 4 we study the case of high/constrained efforts, showing
1Although to simplify the analysis we use linear growth functions instead of strictly concave functions with
a finite carrying capacity.
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the mechanism at work in a first example (Section 4.1) and opening a more general discussion
in Section 4.2. Section 5 contains the conclusions.
2. The model
Assume a stock of movable resource is distributed on a given territory, partitioned in two
contiguous subareas, zone 1 and zone 2. The stock distribution is given by a nonnegative
column vector x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t))
′, where xi(t) ≥ 0 is the biomass standing on zone i
(i = 1, 2) at time t, t ≥ 0. Natural conditions are such that the natural resource in the two
subareas have different intrinsic reproduction rates Γ1 and Γ2, with Γ2 ≥ Γ1 (with Γ1 not
necessarily positive).
Two agents compete for the exploitation of the resource. We denote by cji (t) the rate of
extraction of the agent j in the location i at time t, with j ∈ {1, 2}.
Although no amount of the resource can be shifted by agents from one zone to the other,
some living stock of the resource moves spontaneously between the regions, from the one with
higher to the one with lower biomass concentration. More precisely we assume the diffusion
process follows Fick’s first law: the flow of the resource from region i to region 3− i at time
t is given by
(1) α(xi(t)− x3−i(t)),
where α > 0 is the diffusion coefficient. The dynamics of the resource stock is then given by
(2)
{
x˙1(t) = Γ1x1(t) + α(x2(t)− x1(t))− c11(t)− c21(t), x1(0) = x◦1 ≥ 0
x˙2(t) = Γ2x2(t) + α(x1(t)− x2(t))− c12(t)− c22(t), x2(0) = x◦2 ≥ 0
and positivity contraints on the control
(3) cji (t) ≥ 0, for all t ≥ 0, i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
and on the stock
(4) xi(t) ≥ 0, for all t ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, 2}.
The j-th player chooses the strategy cj(t) = (cj1(t), c
j
2(t))
′ to maximize either the functional
(5) J j(cj) =
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
(
b1c
j
1(t) + b2c
j
2(t)
)1−σ
1− σ dt,
where σ > 0, σ 6= 1, and bi ∈ [0, 1], or its logarithmic version
(6) J j(cj) =
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt ln
(
b1c
j
1(t) + b2c
j
2(t)
)
dt.
The nonnegative constants b1 and b2 represent iceberg costs, with b1 ≤ b2 if zone 1 harder to
reach than zone 2.2
We also take into account the fact that extraction of a resource is more difficult in territories
where the resource is scarser. More precisely we consider a Schaefer production function,
assuming that the harvest of agent j in region i depends on the agent’s effort Eji (t), on the
level of stock, and on a catchability parameter βi combined linearly to obtain
(7) cji (t) = βjE
j
i (t)xi(t).
2The quantities (1− b1) and (1− b2) can be also interpreted as taxes, although revenue from taxes is not
part of our model.
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Assuming that the maximal total effort exerted by agent j, that is Eji (t) + E
j
3−i(t), is finite
and normalized to 1, from (7) we derive the constraint
(8)
cj1(t)
β1x1(t)
+
cj2(t)
β2x2(t)
≤ 1.
We call an equilibrium any Markovian (possibly symmetric) equilibrium of the game de-
scribed by the state equation (2), the payoff (5) or (6), and the constraints (3) (4) (8).3
In the next sections we provide existence of equilibria in two different sets of data. In
Section 3 we study the low harvesting intensity case, i.e. the case when the set of parameters
(ρ, σ, βi, bi, Γi, α) is such that constraints (8) are never binding. In Section 4 we study the
case in which constraints (8) are binding.
3. Solution of the model in the low harvesting intensity case
In this section we study the game described by (2) (3) (4) (5) and (8) in three different
scenarios: (a) the common property case, where each agent can decide, at any times in which
region(s) to harvest and how much; (b) the reservoir case, in which the regulator forbid the
agents to harvest in one of the two regions; (c) the TURF Case, in which each player can only
harvest in a specific (exclusive) region. In all three cases we will choose a set of parameters
such that (8) is not binding. This assumption translates, in terms of the problem, into the
requirement that the value z, representing the intensity of harvest and defined differently
in the three cases, is a sufficiently small positive number - summarizing, the intensity of
harvesting is “low”. A representation of this set of parameters is given in Figure 1 and
commented in Remark 3.5.
It is useful to consider the vector representation of (2), that is
x′(t) = Mx(t)− C(t)e, x(0) = (x◦1, x◦2)′
where, if {e1, e2} is the canonical base of column vectors for R2, and
M :=
(
Γ1 − α α
α Γ2 − α
)
, C(t) =
(
c11(t) c
2
1(t)
c12(t) c
2
2(t)
)
, e = e1 + e2.
The matrix M has two distinct eigenvalues, and we denote the largest with λ. From α > 0
one derives that eigenvectors associated to λ are all proportional to η = (1, µ)′ , where µ ≥ 1
(and µ > 1 when Γ2 > Γ1).
4
3.1. The Common Property Case. The scenario here considered is that in which players
are free to choose to fish in zone 1 or zone 2 (or both). We consider the instance of the game
described above with payoff (5), and we look for symmetric equilibria. What we will prove
is that there exists an equilibrium where both the player fish in just one zone (the same for
both) depending on the ratio b2b1 , at least for some values of the parameters and for initial
data in a subset of R2+. In order to qualify this set of parameters, we define for z ≥ 0 the set
Sz of y ∈ R satisfying
(9)

Γ1 − α+ αy − 2z(1 + µy) = Γ2 − α+ α 1y
z(1 + µy) ≤ β1
y ≥ 0.
3We could equivalently describe strategies in terms of Eji rather than c
j
i .
4More explicitly, λ = 1
2
[
Γ1 + Γ2 − 2α+
√
4α2 + (Γ2 − Γ1)2
]
, while µ = 2α√
4α2+(Γ2−Γ1)2−(Γ2−Γ1)
.
6 G.FABBRI, S.FAGGIAN, AND G. FRENI
and z∗1 as the maximum z for which Sz is nonempty. Note that: (a) the second and third
inequality imply z ≤ β1; (b) z ≥ 0 implies, after some computation, z < α/(2µ); (c) the first
equation has two solutions and (b) implies that only one is (strictly) positive; (d) z∗1 is the
maximum z ≥ 0 such that
z
[
1 +
µ
2(α− 2µz)
(
Γ2 − Γ1 + 2z +
√
(Γ2 − Γ1 + 2z)2 + 4α(α− 2µz)
)]
≤ β1
from which one derives in particular that z∗1 > 0.
Analogously, we define z∗2 as the maximum z ≥ 0 for which the set of r ∈ R such that
(10)

Γ1 − α+ α1r = Γ2 − α+ αr − 2z( 1µr + 1)
z( 1µr + 1) ≤ β2
r ≥ 0
is nonempty, with z∗2 resulting positive as well.
Theorem 3.1 Set z = ρ−(1−σ)λ2σ−1 , and assume µ >
b2
b1
, 0 < z ≤ z∗1, and (x◦1, x◦2) in
C1 = {(x1, x2) ∈ R2+ : x2x1 ≤ 1µ(
β1
z − 1)}. Then a Markovian equilibrium is given by
(11)
c11(t) = z (x1(t) + µx2(t)) , c
1
2(t) ≡ 0
c21(t) = z (x1(t) + µx2(t)) , c
2
2(t) ≡ 0,
and the utilities of players at equilibrium are, respectively, v1(x◦1, x◦2), v2(x◦1, x◦2), where
(12) v2(x1, x2) = v
1(x1, x2) = b
1−σ
1
(x1 + µx2)
1−σ
zσ(1− σ)
Similarly, if µ < b2b1 and 0 < z ≤ z∗2, the equilibrium is given by
c11(t) ≡ 0, c12(t) = zµ (x1(t) + µx2(t))
c21(t) ≡ 0, c22(t) = zµ (x1(t) + µx2(t)) .
and
v2(x1, x2) = v
1(x1, x2) =
(
b2
µ
)1−σ (x1 + µx2)1−σ
zσ(1− ρ) .
Remark 3.2 (a) Note that the theorem establishes the existence of a local Markovian
equilibrium as defined for instance in Dockner and Wagener (2014), p. 588. In particular
such equilibrium exists if z is small enough.
(b) In the case b1 = b2 the theorem says that, for initial data in the cone C and for a
positive z an equilibrium policy is that in which both players fish only in the least productive
zone 1, so that fish that reproduce at a higher rate Γ2 > Γ1 in zone 2 are not harvested.
Remark 3.3 Along the proof of the theorem we will show that
(13) x1(t) + µx2(t) = 〈x(t), η〉 = (x◦1 + µx◦2)egt
with g = λ − 2z = λ−2ρ2σ−1 . In particular, the equilibrium strategies cji and utilities vj depend
merely on the projection of x(t) along the direction of the eigenvector η.
Remark 3.4 We note that the extraction/consumption policy of the symmetric interior
equilibrium has the same form as the policy function of the homogeneous stock case, where
each agent’s consumption is a fixed proportion of the stock. Since the state here is a two
dimensional vector, extraction is linear in the value of the stock, so µ is actually the relative
price of the stock in zone 2. Intuitively, µ ≥ 1 because Γ2 ≥ Γ1. To explain the coefficient of
the policy function, note that in a multidimensional linear setting the one-sector “productivity
of the stock” is substituted by the von Neumann maximum rate of growth, that in our single
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production framework coincides with the dominant eigenvalue of the production matrix M
(see e.g., Freni, Gozzi and Salvadori, 2006).
Proof. We analyse the case µ > b1b2 since the one with opposite inequality can be treated
similarly. We also procede neglecting constraints (4) and (8), and check they are satisfied a
posteriori.
Step 1: Solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for player 1. We assume player
2 fishes only in zone 1, using a strategy c21(t) = w 〈η, x(t)〉 with w ∈ R+, and c22(t) = 0. Then
player 1 has to choose c1 so to maximize J1(c1) given by (5) and subject to
x˙(t) = Mx(t)− w 〈η, x(t)〉 e1 − c1(t), x(0) = x.
The Hamiltonian function for a couple (x, p) ∈ R2 × R2 is given by
H(x, p) = 〈p,Mx〉 − w 〈η, x〉 〈p, e1〉+ sup
c11,c
1
2≥0
{(
b1c
1
1 + b2c
1
2
)1−σ
1− σ −
〈
p, c1
〉}
= 〈p,Mx〉 − w 〈η, x〉 〈p, e1〉+ σ
1− σ min
{
p1
b1
,
p2
b2
}1−1/σ
where the supremum is attained on the boundary, either at
(14) c1∗1 =
1
b1
(
p1
b1
)− 1
σ
, c1∗2 = 0
or at
c1∗1 = 0, c
1∗
2 =
1
b2
(
p2
b2
)− 1
σ
It is then easy to check that the HJB equation ρv(x) = H(x,∇v(x)) associated to the
problem has a solution of type v(x) = 11−σ (β 〈η, x〉)1−σ . Indeed, ∇v(x) = β1−σ 〈η, x〉−σ η
and Mη = λη imply
〈∇v(x),Mx〉 = 〈M∇v(x), x〉 = β1−σ 〈η, x〉−σ 〈Mη, x〉 = λβ1−σ 〈η, x〉1−σ ,
moreover, since µ > b1b2 , one has
min
{
∂1v(x)
b1
,
∂2v(x)
b2
}
= β1−σ 〈η, x〉−σ min
{
1
b1
,
µ
b2
}
=
1
b1
β1−σ 〈η, x〉−σ .
Hence HJB is verified when β satisfies
β =
(
σ
ρ− (λ− w) (1− σ)
) σ
1−σ
b1.
Step 2: Nash equilibrium. From (14), the optimal fishing strategy for player 1 is
c1∗1 (t) =
ρ− (λ− w) (1− σ)
σ
〈η, x(t)〉 , c1∗2 (t) = 0.
We may repeat the argument from the standpoint of player 2, assuming player 1 has a
strategy of type c11(t) = u 〈η, x(t)〉 for some u ∈ R+ and c12(t) = 0, deriving
c2∗1 (t) =
ρ− (λ− u) (1− σ)
σ
〈η, x(t)〉 , c2∗2 (t) = 0.
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Then
(
c1∗, c2∗
)
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if c1 = c
∗
1 and c2 = c
∗
2, that is{
w = ρ−(λ−u)(1−σ)σ
u = ρ−(λ−w)(1−σ)σ
which implies
w = u =
ρ− λ(1− σ)
2σ − 1 = z, β = z
σ
σ−1
and, as a consequence, (11) and (12).
Step 3: Constraints are satisfied. We now check (4) and (8) along the trajectories at
equilibrium. Set y(t) = x2(t)/x1(t), and note that (8) is, at equilibrium, equivalent to
(15) z(1 + µy(t)) ≤ β1, ∀t ≥ 0.
Since y˙(t)/y(t) = x˙2(t)/x2(t)− x˙1(t)/x1(t), then y(t) satisfies
y˙(t) = (2µz − α)y2(t) + (Γ2 − Γ1 + 2z)y(t) + α.
which has, in view of (9), two stationary solutions, y1 < 0 and y2 > 0, with y2 an attractor
from all initial values y(0) = x◦2/x◦1. Moreover, if y(0) > y2 then y(t)↘ y2, so that (x◦1, x◦2) ∈
C1 implies that (15) is verified. When instead y(0) < y2, then y(t) ↗ y2 where y2 is the
unique solution of (9), so that (15) is verified again. Positivity constraints (4) also follow
from monotonicity of y(t) and positivity of y2.
Step 4: Verification Theorem. In order to prove that the solution of the HJB equation
is in fact the value function of the problem, one has to prove a verification theorem. The
proof of this fact is standard (and we omit it for brevity) once we have shown the transver-
sality condition limt→+∞ e−ρtv(x(t)) = 0. Indeed along the equilibrium trajectories one has
d/(dt) 〈x(t), η〉 = (λ − 2z) 〈x(t), η〉 , so that (13) holds true, and e−ρtv(x(t)) decreases expo-
nentially to zero with rate −ρ+ (1− σ)(λ− 2z) = −z < 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O ρ  
A B 
C D 
1−σ  
E 
 
F 
 
Figure 1. Varying parameters ρ and σ satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 3.1.
Case µ > b2b1
Remark 3.5 In Figure 1 we represent parameters σ and ρ for which z ∈ (0, z∗1 ] is satisfied
(blue region), in the case µ > b2b1 . The line z = 0 is OB while z = z
∗
1 is AC, and they cross at
(λ/2, 1/2) for all β1. If β1 increases, then AC rotates counterclockwise, and when β1 → +∞
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then AC tends to coincide with FD. At this limit value, x1 becomes null. Note that “low
intensity harvestig” takes place for couples (ρ, 1−σ) close to the OB. On the other hand, the
area AEB is where we have the voracity effect we better describe in Section 3.4.
Remark 3.6 For a logarithmic utility the situation is similar to that described in Theorem
3.1. For instance, when µ > b2b1 and 0 < z ≡ ρ ≤ z∗1 the equilibrium is given by
(16)
c11(t) = ρ (x1(t) + µx2(t)) , c
1
2(t) ≡ 0
c21(t) = ρ (x1(t) + µx2(t)) , c
2
2(t) ≡ 0,
and the utility is v2(x1, x2) = v
1(x1, x2) =
1
ρ
(
λ−2ρ
ρ + ln (b1ρ) + ln(x1 + µx2)
)
.
Remark 3.7 When µ = b2b1 each player j is indifferent among all the strategies (c
j
1, c
j
2) such
that
cj1(t) + µc
j
2(t) =
ρ− (1− σ)λ
2σ − 1 (x
◦
1 + µx
◦
2) .
Since several possible indifferent strategies are possible, the constraint on the initial datum is
less stringent than in Proposition 3.1 and in particular a feasible equilibrium in the described
set exists as long as at least as one of the second conditions of (9) or (10) is verified. In
general, a local linear symmetric Markov equilibrium in which
cj1(t) = θ
ρ− (1− σ)λ
2σ − 1 (x
◦
1 + µx
◦
2)
cj2(t) = (1− θ)
ρ− (1− σ)λ
2σ − 1
1
µ
(x◦1 + µx
◦
2)
and θ ∈ [0, 1] exists under conditions less stringent than those in Theorem 3.1. The same
argument applies to the case of logarithmic utility discussed in Remark 3.6.
3.2. The Reservoir Case. In a second scenario one region is kept as a reservoir and fishing
is there forbidden. If that region is the one where agents would not fish even if free to choose,
a Markovian equilibrium is obtained as in Section 3.1. If harvesting is forbidden in the zone
where players would rather fish, then further investigation is necessary. We carry out the
case when µ > b2/b1, meaning that players would rather fish in zone 1, but fishing is there
forbidden.
Theorem 3.8 Let z∗2 as defined in (10), and z =
ρ−(1−σ)λ
2σ−1 . Assume 0 < z ≤ z∗2, µ > b2b1 ,
and (x◦1, x◦2) in C2 = {(x1, x2) ∈ R2+ : x1/x2 ≤ µ(β2/z − 1)} . Assume that harvesting is
forbidden in zone 1. Then a Markovian equilibrium is given by
(17)
c11(t) = 0, c
1
2(t) =
z
µ (x1(t) + µx2(t))
c21(t) = 0, c
2
2(t) =
z
µ (x1(t) + µx2(t)) ,
and the utilities of players at equilibrium are, respectively, v1(x◦1, x◦2), v2(x◦1, x◦2), where
v2(x1, x2) = v
1(x1, x2) =
(
b2
µ
)1−σ (x1 + µx2)1−σ
zσ(1− ρ) .
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.1 and we omit it. A similar result holds in the
case when µ < b2/b1, and z ∈ (0, z∗1 ], and harvesting is forbidden in zone 2. Extensions to
the case of logarithmic utility, and to the case µ = b2b1 are possible, yielding results similar to
those mentioned, respectively, in Remarks 3.6 and 3.7.
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3.3. The TURF Case. In the third considered scenario each player has the right of exclusive
exploitation of one of the two regions (say, player 1 of zone 1 and player 2 of zone 2). The
evolution of stocks is now described by
(18)
{
x˙1(t) = (Γ1 − α)x1(t) + αx2(t)− c1(t), x1(0) = x◦1
x˙2(t) = (Γ2 − α)x2(t) + αx1(t)− c2(t), x2(0) = x◦2
where ci(t) is the harvesting intensity chosen by player i, in zone i, at time t, so that player
i is maximizing
J i(ci) =
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
(bici(t))
1−σ
1− σ dt.
Consider z ∈ [0, αµ ], and the set of solutions y ∈ R of the system
(19)

Γ1 − α− z + (α− zµ)y = Γ2 − α− z + (α− 1µz) 1y
z(1 + µy) ≤ β1
z( 1yµ + 1) ≤ β2
y ≥ 0.
Define z∗3 as the maximum z for which the previous set is nonempty. Note that the second
and third inequality imply y ∈ [z (β2 − z) /µ, (β1/z − 1) /µ] , and that this interval tends to
the positive halfline for z → 0+.
Theorem 3.9 Let z = ρ−(1−σ)λ2σ−1 , and assume 0 < z ≤ z∗3, and (x◦1, x◦2) in
C3 =
{
(x1, x2) ∈ R2+ :
1
µ
z
β2 − z ≤
x2
x1
≤ 1
µ
β1 − z
z
}
.
Then a Markovian equilibrium is given by
(20) c1(t) = z (x1(t) + µx2(t)) , c2(t) =
z
µ
(x1(t) + µx2(t)) ,
and the utilities of players at equilibrium are, respectively, v1(x◦1, x◦2), v2(x◦1, x◦2), where
(21) v1(x1, x2) = b
1−σ
1
(x1 + µx2)
1−σ
zσ(1− σ) , v
2(x1, x2) =
(
b2
µ
)1−σ (x1 + µx2)1−σ
zσ(1− σ)
Proof. We procede as in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Assume that the strategy of player 2 is
of type c2(t) = w〈η, x(t)〉 with w > 0 given. Then player 1 has to choose c1 so to maximize
J1(c1) and subject to
x˙(t) = Mx(t)− w 〈η, x(t)〉 e2 − c1(t)e1, x(0) = x◦.
The Hamiltonian function associated to the problem, for (x, p) ∈ R2 × R2, is
H(x, p) = 〈p,Mx〉 − w 〈η, x〉 〈p, e2〉+ sup
c1≥0
{
(b1c1)
1−σ
1− σ − c1p1
}
= 〈p,Mx〉 − w 〈η, x〉 p2 + σ
1− σ
(
p1
b1
)1− 1
σ
with supremum is attained at
(22) c1 =
1
b1
(
p1
b1
)− 1
σ
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The HJB equation ρv(x) = H(x,∇v(x)) has a solution of type v(x) = 11−σ (β 〈η, x〉)1−σ , with
β = b1
(
ρ− (λ− µw) (1− σ)
σ
) σ
σ−1
.
as it is easy to check by direct proof. From (22), the optimal fishing strategy for player 1 is
c∗1(t) =
ρ− (λ− wµ)(1− σ)
σ
〈η, x(t)〉 .
We may repeat the argument from the standpoint of player 2, assuming player 1 has a strategy
of type c1(t) = u 〈η, x(t)〉 for some u ∈ R+, deriving a solution of the HJB equation of type
v(x) = (1− σ)−1(γ〈η, x〉)1−σ, with
γ =
b2
µ
(
ρ− (1− σ)(λ− u)
σ
) σ
σ−1
and the optimal strategy
c∗2(t) =
ρ− (λ− u)(1− σ)
σµ
〈η, x(t)〉 .
Then (c∗1, c∗2) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if c1 = c∗1 and c2 = c∗2, that is{
w = ρ−(λ−u)(1−σ)σµ
u = ρ−(λ−µw)(1−σ)σ
which implies
µw = u =
ρ− λ(1− σ)
2σ − 1 = z, β = b1 z
σ
σ−1 , γ =
b2
µ
z
σ
σ−1
and, as a consequence, (20) and (21).
We now check (4) and (8) along the trajectories at equilibrium. Set y(t) = x2(t)/x1(t),
and note that (8) is, at equilibrium, equivalent to
(23)
{
z(1 + µy(t)) ≤ β1, ∀t ≥ 0
z
µ
(
1
y(t) + µ
)
≤ β2, ∀t ≥ 0
and that y(t) satisfies
y˙(t) = −(α− µz)y2(t) + (Γ2 − Γ1)y(t) + α− z
µ
.
The above equation has, in view of (19), two stationary solutions y1 < 0 and y2 > 0, with y2
an attractor. Hence positivity constraints (4) are verified. Now note that if y(0) > y2 then
y(t)↘ y2. Hence, since y(0) = x◦2/x◦1, and (x◦1, x◦2) ∈ C, we have
z(1 + µy(t)) ≤ z
(
1 + µ
x◦2
x◦1
)
≤ β1, ∀t ≥ 0.
On the other hand, y(t) ≥ y2 for all t ≥ 0 and y2 solves (19), so that
z
µ
(
1
y(t)
+ µ
)
≤ z
µ
(
1
y2
+ µ
)
≤ β2 ∀t ≥ 0.
and (23) holds true along the whole trajectory. Similarly one proves that (23) are satisfied
in the case y(0) < y2. Finally the proof of the transversality condition is similar to that of
Theorem 3.1 and we omit it for brevity. 
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3.4. Impact of the policies in the low harvesting intensity case. In the previous
subsections we analysed the cases where: (a) players are free to choose to fish in both zone
1 and 2 (no harvesting policies), (b) a policy is introcuced by creation of a reservoir; (c)
a policy is introduced by creation of TURFS. We now intend to compare how welfares of
players change after the introduction of policies (b) and (c) in comparison to the case (a) of
absence of policies.
To fix ideas, assume that µ > b2b1 , set z =
ρ−λ(1−σ)
2σ−1 , and consider a set of parameters such
that 0 < z ≤ min{z∗1 , z∗2 , z∗3}, where z∗i were defined in (9), (10) and (19). Assume also that
the initial condition (x◦1, x◦2) belongs to C1 ∩C2 ∩C3 where Ci were defined in theorems 3.1,
3.8 and 3.9.
In terms of impact on the welfare of the two players, the introduction of policies is not
very encouraging. If in the case of no policy (common property case) we have
v2cp(x1, x2) = v
1
cp(x1, x2) = b
1−σ
1
(x1 + µx2)
1−σ
zσ(1− σ)
then:
• introducing the reservoir strictly decreases the welfare of all players, changing it from
vjcp to
v2res(x1, x2) = v
1
res(x1, x2) =
(
b2
µ
)1−σ (x1 + µx2)1−σ
zσ(1− σ)
with µ > b2b1 implying v
j
res < v
j
cp.
• introducing TURFS leaves unchanged the utility of the player assigned to zone 1
(player 1, according to our choice) while it reduces the welfare of the player assigned
to zone 2 (player 2) from v2cp to
v2turf (x1, x2) =
(
b2
µ
)1−σ (x1 + µx2)1−σ
zσ(1− σ)
with v2turf = v
2
res < v
2
cp.
The introduction of policies is not satisfactory even in terms of safeguard of the natural
resource. Indeed, even if the dynamics of the two stocks x1(t) and x2(t) can be different in
the three cases (a) (b) (c), at the equilibrium the total stock of the resource x1(t) + x2(t)
satisfies (13) in all cases so that
1
µ
(x◦1 + µx
◦
2)e
tg ≤ x1(t) + x2(t) ≤ (x◦1 + µx◦2)etg.
where g = λ−2z = λ−2ρ2σ−1 may be positive or negative. This means that, although these policies
could affect the level of the resource, they cannot affect its growth rate. In particular, when
the resource is eventually exhausted in the common property case, exhaustion takes place
even when the described policies are enforced.
We finally analyse the effect of policies that increase the rate of growth or reduce resource
mobility between regions. We start by noting that, as in Tornell and Lane (1999), a voracity
effect characterizes our interior equilibrium when 1 − σ > 12 (this is the analog of Tornell
and Lane’s (1999) condition (21) on p. 30). In this case, which occurs when the preference
parameters belong to triangle AEB in Figure 1, a positive technological shock, i.e. an increase
in the value of the eigenvalue λ, reduces the equilibrium rate of growth. Each agent reacts to
the the shock by increasing extraction more than proportionally and this in the end results
in a fall of the post-extraction growth of the resource stocks.
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Indeed, note that the dominant root λ, has a simple interpretation in terms of the techno-
logical primitives of the model as a weighted average of the two intrinsic rates of growth Γ1
and Γ2, with the weights depending, if Γ1 6= Γ2, on the diffusivity coefficient α (of course if
Γ1 = Γ2 ≡ Γ then λ = Γ). To see this, we eliminate µ between the two equations
(24) Γ1 + α(µ− 1) = λ
(25) Γ2µ+ α(1− µ) = λµ
reaching in the case Γ1 < Γ2 the relationship
(26) α =
(λ− Γ1)(Γ2 − λ)
2λ− (Γ1 + Γ2) .
Taking the derivative of this function we establish dαdλ < 0. Moreover, since from equations
(24) and (25) we have λ ∈ [Γ1,Γ2], we note that α > 0 implies the tighter restriction
λ ∈ (Γ1+Γ22 ,Γ2). Then, it can be easily seen that λ→ Γ2 for α→ 0 and that λ→ Γ1+Γ22 for
α → ∞. The meaning of these results is that increasing resource mobility between the two
regions diminishes the maximum rate of growth that can be obtained in the system.
Using again equations (24) and (25), we can also establish that λ is increasing with the
implicit rates of growth of the two regions. This follows from the fact that µ increases with
Γ2 and decreases with Γ1. That λ increases with Γ1 then follows from equation (24), and
that it increases also with Γ2 follows from (25).
To summarize, if voracity prevails, then positive technological shocks that increase the
implicit rates of growth of two regions or reduce resource mobility between the regions lead
to strategic responses that actually reduces growth.
4. Effectiveness of the policy in the high harvesting intensity case
4.1. A first example. We begin by looking at a very specific case, showing which are the
mechanisms at work when the constraint (8) are binding. Then we will discuss how the
mechanisms at work are effective in a more general situation.
We assume Γ1 = Γ2 = 2/3, β1 = β2 = 1, α = 2/3, b1 = b2 = 1 and ρ ∈ (1/3, 1/2), to fix
ideas ρ = 5/12. As a consequence, λ = Γ, µ = 1. We also assume a logarithmic utility (6).
Firstly we consider the case in which the two players are free to fish in the two regions
and free to choose how to distribute their effort among the two. Note that Remark 3.6 and
Remark 3.7 apply, as long as the equilibria there described are feasible. That means that,
if we denote with s(t) the overall stock of fish, namely s(t) = x1(x) + x2(t) then, for any
θ ∈ [0, 1], a Markov equilibrium would be given by cji satisfying
cj1(t) + c
j
2(t) ≡ θρs(t) + (1− θ)ρs(t) = ρs(t), ∀t ≥ 0, j = 1, 2.
We then check that with this choice of parameters and for any (x◦1, x◦2) ∈ R2+ the equilibirum
satisfies all constraints. In particular (8) reads as
(27) ρs(t)
(
θ
x1(t)
+
1− θ
x2(t)
)
≤ 1
and since θx1 +
1−θ
s−x1 is maximal when x1 = θs, the constraint is more stringent when x1(t) =
θs(t) and x2(t) = (1 − θ)s(t), which plugged into (27) give the condition ρ ≤ 1/2, satisfied
by assumption. The positivity of stocks follows trivially.
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Note now that s˙(t) = gs(t), with g = α − 2ρ < 0 given that ρ > 1/3, so that the overall
stock s(t) = (x◦1 + x◦2)egt is asimptotically decreasing to 0 (extinction). The corresponding
utilities of players are both equal to
(28) J j(cj) =
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt ln(ρs(t))dt =
ln(ρ(x◦1 + x◦2)) + λ− 2ρ
ρ
.
Secondly, we consider the case when a marine reserve is set up in zone 2, so that forcedly
c12 = c
2
2 ≡ 0. To fix ideas, we suppose x◦2 ≥ 2x◦1. We start by showing that strategies
(29) c11(t) = c
2
1(t) = x1(t)
constitute a linear Markov equilibrium. To this extent, we assume player 2 adopts the strategy
c21(t) = x1(t) so that player 1 maximizes J
1(c1) subject to
(30)

x˙1(t) = −x1(t) + 23x2(t)− c11(t), t ≥ 0
x˙2(t) =
2
3x1(t), t ≥ 0
(x1(0), x2(0)) = (x
◦
1, x
◦
2)
Note that (8) is satisfied for player 2, while it imposes c11(t) ≤ x1(t) on player 1. The HJB
equation associated to (30) and J1(c1) is
(31) ρv(x1, x2) =
〈( −x1 + 23x2
2
3x1
)
,∇v(x1, x2)
〉
+ sup
c11∈[0,x1]
{
ln(c11)− ∂x1v(x1, x2)c11
}
We show next that c1(t) = x1(t) is the best response of player 1. If that is true, the value
function of the problem is
(32) V (x◦) =
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt ln(x1(t))dt =
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt ln〈etAe1, x◦〉dt
where x1(t) is the first component of the solution x(t) = e
tAx◦ to
(33)

x˙1(t) = −2x1(t) + 23x2(t), t > 0
x˙2(t) =
2
3x1(t), t > 0
(x1(0), x2(0)) = x
◦
where A =
( −2 23
2
3 0
)
, that is
x1(t) = 〈etAx◦, e1〉 = 〈etAe1, x◦〉.
Note also that x2(t)/x1(t) satisfies an ordinary differential equation with stationary solutions
3/2±√13/2 with 3/2+√13/2 an attractor. This implies, in particular, that etAe1 is a vector
with positive coordinates, since it is the solution to (33) with initial condition (1, 0).
Next we prove V solves the HJB equation. The partial derivatives of V are given by
∂x1V (x) =
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
〈
etAe1, e1
〉
〈etAe1, x〉 dt, ∂x2V (x) =
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
〈
etAe1, e2
〉
〈etAe1, x〉 dt
Note that, since we are assuming x◦2 ≥ 2x◦1 ≥ 0, that remains true along the entire trajectory,
and we have
0 ≤ ∂x1V (x) ≤
1
x1
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
〈
etAe1, e1
〉
〈etAe1, e1 + 2e2〉dt =:
1
x1
I <
1
x1
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where the value of I is strictly less than 1 (I ' 0.69, with ρ = 5/12). Thus
arg max
c11∈[0,x1]
(
ln(c11)− ∂x1V (x1, x2)c11
)
= x1
and
max
c11∈[0,x1]
(
ln(c11)− ∂x1V (x1, x2)c11
)
= ln(x1)− ∂x1V (x1, x2)x1.
Using this fact we can see that the right hand side in (31) is equal to
(34)
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
〈(−x1 + 23x2) e1 + 23x1e2, etAe1〉
〈etAe1, x〉 dt+ ln(x1) +
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
〈−x1e1, etAe1〉
〈etAe1, x〉 dt
=
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
〈
Ax, etAe1
〉
〈etAe1, x〉 dt+ ln(x1)
so that (31) is verified if and only if
ρ
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt ln
〈
etAe1, x
〉
dt =
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
〈
Ax, etAe1
〉
〈etAe1, x〉 dt+ ln(x1)
that is if and only if ∫ +∞
0
− d
dt
[
e−ρt ln
〈
etAe1, x
〉]
dt = ln(x1)
which is trivially satisfied. By means of a standard verification theorem one can prove that
V (x) defined in (32) is the optimal output of player 1 so that the proof that c11(t) = x1(t) is
the optimal response of player 1 is complete. Simmetrically operating from the standpoint
of player 2, one finally derives that (29) represents a linear symmetric Markov equilibrium.
The dynamics of the system along the equilibrium is given by (33) with x◦2 ≥ 2x◦1 ≥ 0.
Finally we show that the reservoir policy preserves fish from extinction for initial data x◦
with x◦2 ≥
√
3+3
2 x
◦
1. Note that the eigenvalues of A are −(
√
13+3)/3 < 0 and (
√
13−3)/3 > 0
associated respectively to eigenvectors v1 = (−(
√
13 + 3)/2, 1)′ and v2 = ((
√
13− 3)/2, 1)′.
Then, for t growing to +∞, one has
x(t) = etAx◦ =
〈x◦, v1〉
|v1|2 e
−
√
13+3
3
tv1 +
〈x◦, v2〉
|v2|2 e
√
13−3
3
tv2 ∼ 〈x
◦, v2〉
|v2|2 e
√
13−3
3
tv2
where 〈x◦, v2〉 v2 has positive components along both coordinate axes if and only if x◦2 ≥
(
√
3 + 3)/2 x◦1. Hence, in the long run the total fish stock – and also the two stocks x1(t) and
x2(t) separately – grow at a positive rate.
We can also compare the welfare of the two players. Note that with no reservoir (28)
utilities depended from the overall stock s(0) = x◦1 +x◦2, while in presence of a marine reserve
the result may change, for better or worse, depending on the initial distribution among the
two regions. In particular, for some sets of initial condition welfare increases in presence of
the marine reserve (to have a numeric example, take (x◦1, x◦2) = (1, 2)).
4.2. The mechanisms at work in the example and more general situations: a
discussion. Let us summarize why both spatial property rights and reserves are at best
ineffective when the coefficient of the extraction/consumption policy of the interior symmetric
equilibrium is low. Note that granting secure extraction rights to player 1 in zone 1 and to
player 2 in zone 2 is equivalent to setting b1 = 0 in the control problem of 2 and b2 = 0 in
the control problem of player 1. On the other hand, the creation of a reserve in zone 1 is
equivalent to setting b1 = 0 for both players. If
ρ−(1−σ)λ
2σ−1 ≤ min{z∗1 , z∗2}, then each player
reacts to these new regulations by adapting the linear policy that characterizes our interior
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Markov equilibrium to the new set of parameters. The rate of growth of the resource is
unaffected by this change od behavior and the welfare of each player is at best unchanged.
In the above specific example we have z∗1 = z∗2 =
1
3 and a logarithmic utility (i.e., 1− σ = 0),
so we find policy-ineffectiveness if ρ ≤ 13 .
However, we have also shown that if ρ−(1−σ)λ2σ−1 > min{z∗1 , z∗2}, but the interior equilibrium
still exists under the common property or TURF regimes, creating a nature reserve in the
zone with the maximum z∗ can increase the rate of growth of the resource and the welfare
of the players. Indeed an extreme equilibrium in which the effort constraint is binding can
exist in this case. Although a complete analysis of the existence conditions of this extreme
equilibrium is not given in this paper, our example is sufficient to show that the set parameters
for which it exists is nonempty. More in general, even a TURF management system can be
somewhat effective if, with its institution, the effort constraint of an player is binding.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we develop a continuous time model in which two players compete to exploit
a resource which can move and diffuse among two zones. It provides an analytically tractable
model which can capture the difficulties to design, in the context of spatially distributed
resource, an efficient systems of spatial property rights.
We compare the behaviors of the players in a initial common property case, where they
can decide both where and how much to harvest, with their choices in two main policies-
constrained cases: the first where the regulator can establish a natural reserve (i.e., where
harvesting in one of the two zones is forbidden) and the second where each player has an
exclusive exploitation rights on one of the two locations. We show that the policies are com-
pletely ineffective (and also harmful in terms of utilities of the players) when the conditions
lead the players to choose a low exploitation intensity of the resource, while they can be useful
for safeguarding the resource and also in terms of players’ utility in case of high exploitation
intensity.
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